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The Government 
Contractor Defense 
David J. Stout, J.D. 
David J. Stout is a lawyer with Carpenter & Chavez. He 
received his JD.from the University of New Mexico School of 
Law in 1982. 
Introduction 
Litigation involving defective products has increasingly 
�come a pre-trial battle to overcome a series of technical 
defenses that have become a stock part of the manufacturer's 
defense. Defendants invariably 
raise the government contractor 
defense where the defective 
product resulted from some gov­
ernmental involvement in the 
manufacturing process, no mat­
ter how peripheral or superflu­
ous was the government's in­
volvement in that process. 1 The 
defense appears in a wide vari­
ety of contexts including a fork­
lift manufactured for use in a 
Air Force commissary, the re-
David J. Stout straint systems of a city bus and 
in the design of a postal dis-
!
atcher.2 It is almost a certainty that plaintiffs will confront this 
efense in products liability litigation generally on a motion for 
ummary judgment but often on a motion to dismiss as well. 
I The government contractor defense is extremely fact 
ensitive and should never be subject to a l 2(b )6 dismissal.3 It 
simportant, however, that where you anticipate the defense in 
urcase, you immediately propound discovery to identify the 
ocuments and witnesses that can provide the information 
hich wilJ ,, llrm, "'"l to defeat the defense on summary judg­
(Continued on Page 105) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Litigating mild closed head-injury cases requires the 
plaintiff's attorney to present the unseen and to advocate from 
intangible evidence. No two cases are alike, and research and 
preparation for each case is unique. 
This paper is an outline of the concept, preparation and 
presentation ofa successful case from the plaintiff's perspective. 
The steps discussed show an approach which can be repeated to 
build the foundation for research, preparation and presentation 
of mild head injury cases. 
Research and preparation assistance was provided by 
Advanced Research Information Services, Inc., Lawrence F. 
Wilson, Ph.D., Information Research Consultant, including: 
review of case materials, issues of causation and liability; 
development of underlying themes for the jury selection and 
case presentation; selection of "anchors" to explain "intan-
(Continued on Page 111) 
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ment. It is also imperative that you thoroughly understand the 
basis of the defense and how it operates as a practical matter. 
his article is an attempt to provide that understanding. 
The key to understanding the government contractor 
defense is to recognize its limited theoretical basis. Where that 
theoretical basis is absent the defense should not apply. The 
government contractor defense derives ultimately from the 
government's sovereign immunity and the belief that its discre­
tionary decisions should not be subject to second-guessing by 
courts or juries. Thus, the socio-political basis of the defense is 
to protect government policy decisions from judicial review. 
Where some identifiable government policy is not in direct 
conflict with the asserted cause of action, then the government 
contractor defense should have no application.4 The defense by 
its nature, therefore, only applies to design defect cases. A 
defect in the manufacturing process is not protected by the 
defense. In addition, the defense should almost never be avail­
able in failure to warn claims because, as discussed infra, there 
is virtually no conceivable federal policy which would conflict 
with providing adequate warnings. 
The Defense 
The government contract defense arises from federal 
common law.5 Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 
354 (3rd Cir. 1985) ("[F]ederal common law provides a 
defense to liabilities incurred in the performance of govern­
ent contracts."); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 
5th Cir. 1985).6 It has developed primarily in the area of 
military contracts and therefore is largely, though not exclu­
sively, addressed to concerns unique to military specification 
contracts, i.e., military discretionary design decisions based 
upon tactical considerations. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Tech­
nologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1988) 
(design of military equipment is a discretionary function involv­
ing a "trade-off between greater safety and greater combat 
effectiveness"); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43 (N.J. 
Super. Law Div. 1976).7 
Where the defense has been recognized outside the con­
    text of military equipment, it has involved contracts which 
         implicate unique federal interests. See, e.g., Burgess v. Colo­
            rado Serum Co. Inc., 772 F.2d 844, 845 (11th Cir. I 985)
   (serum manufactured under federal contract for use in the
         National Brucellosis Eradication Program); Yearsley v. W.A.   
            , Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. I 8 (1940) (contract with      
           Arm y  Corps of Engineers for construction of dikes along     
     Missouri River); see also Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel ;  
            Paint Co., 892 F.2d I 450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to
recognize federal government contractor defense for civilian 
     employee of Army Corps of Engineers injured by toxic paint       
     fumes).
The controlling formulation of the government contractor 
defense8 has been set out by the United States Supreme Court:
Liability for design defects in military equip­
ment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, 
when (I) the United States approved reasonably 
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed 
to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned 
the United States about the dangers in use of the 
equipment that were known to the supplier but not 
to the United States. 
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. at_, I 08 
S. Ct. at 2518. The test is based upon the central purpose of the
defense which is to protect the discretionary decisions of the
sovereign. Thus, the first two prongs of the test are intended to 
"assure that the design feature in question was considered by a
Government of icer, and not merely by the contractor itself."
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. at __ , 108
S. Ct. at 2518.9 
Where some identifiable government policy is not in direct 
conflict with the asserted cause of action, then the govern­
ment contractor defense should have no application. 
Boyle presented the military contract characteristic of the 
most common circumstances in which courts have applied the 
defense. 10 In Boyle, the plaintiffs decedent was a Marine pilot 
killed when his helicopter crashed in the Atlantic Ocean. Al­
though he survived the crash, he was unable to escape from the 
helicopter because the escape hatch was designed to open 
outward rather than inward making it impossible for him to open 
the hatch against the forces of the ocean waters. The plaintiff 
sued the manufacturer alleging the design was defective. The 
court of appeals held that extensive discussions between the 
United States and the manufacturer, together with the 
government's substantive review of the design feature estab­
lished the government contractor defense. Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 ( 4th Cir. I 986). The Su­
preme Court reversed and remanded for a redetermination of the 
issue in light of its opinion. The Fourth Circuit then remanded 
to the district court. 857 F.2d I 468 ( 4th Cir. 1988). 
In Boyle, the Supreme Court not only sets forth the test for 
this common law defense but, as importantly, grounds the 
analytic justification for the defense in the law of federal 
preemption. 11 Claims against government contractors will be 
preempted and state law displaced only where a significant 
conflict exists between an identifiable federal policy or interest 
and the operation of state law. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515. If the 
contractor could comply with both its federal contractual obli­
gations and the state prescribed duty of care, then no federal 
interest is implicated and the government contractor defense 
does not apply. It is this particular discussion in Boyle which 
leads me to the belief that there is a fourth "element" to the test 
which requires that there be a significant conflict between the 
federal interest served by the defense and allowing a state 
common law product liability claim to proceed. 12 
The Policy Conflict Threshold 
The starting point for any analysis of the defense after 
Boyle must be to determine whether there is a significant 
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conflict between an identifiable federal policy and the applica­
tion of state tort law to the design defect. 13 See Boyle. 108 S.Ct. 
at 2515; Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 
F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1990); Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d
629,634 (5th Cir. 1989). Where no federal policy is implicated,
there is no conflict between state tort law and the federal policy,
and a fortiori no preemption of state common law. Nielsen v.
George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d at 1454-55.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Nielsen makes this point. 
In Nielsen, a painter for the Army Corps of Engineers was 
seriously injured by exposure to fumes from paint manufactured 
by the defendant. The Ninth Circuit refused to apply the govern­
ment contractor defense even though the record apparently 
established that the government had specified the requirements 
for the paint. The reason for the court's rejection of the defense 
was simply that there was no discernible federal policy, such as 
greater combat efficiency, underlying the design decision. 14 The 
court held: 
In this case, we deal with a civilian worker 
injured in the course of a civilian job involving a 
product designed to further civilian, rather than 
military objectives. Under Boyle, we can find no 
reason to hold that application of state law would 
create a "significant conflict" with federal policy 
requiring a displacement of state law. 
Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1455. Where the contractor could 
have complied with its duties under state law without conflict­
ing with some significant federal policy as manifested in its 
contractual obligations, see Dorse v. Armstrong World In­
dustries, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 589, 592 (S.D. Fla. 1989) affd 898 
F .2d 1487 ( I Ith Cir. 1990), the government contractor defense 
simply does not preempt state law. 
The Three Other Prongs of the "Boyle" Test 
The first prong of the Boyle test requires 1) the govern­
ment to have exercised its discretion in fact by approving 
reasonably precise design specifications. See Boyle, I 08 S.Ct. 
at 2518; See also In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District 
New York Asbestos Litigation, 897 F.2d at 629 ("The first 
element ensures that the design specification at issue actually 
was considered by a government official - or, in other words, 
that a government official had made the type of policy decision 
considered a discretionary function under the FTCA." ( empha­
sis added)). 
Government discretion over design specification is the 
central and controlling tenet of the first prong of the Boyle 
defense.15See Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 
F.2d 242,247 (5th Cir. 1990) ("for purposes of the defense the
'proper focus is the protection of the discretionary government
functions for which the defense is intended."'); Trevino v.
General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1479 (5th Cir. 1989)
(the elements in Boyle represent "deference to the discretionary
functions of government."). In order to find that the govern­
ment exercised the kind of specific design discretion sufficient
for the defense, the "Government must ultimately be respon-
sible for the defect." Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition Inc., 
913 F.2d at 248 n. 11. The Second Circuit has succinctly stated 
the rule after Boyle: 
Boyle displaces state law only when the Gov­
ernment, making a discretionary, safety-related mili­
tary procurement decision contrary to the require­
ments of state law, incorporates this decision into a 
military contractor's contractual obligations, thereby 
limiting the contractor's ability to accommodate 
safety in a different fashion. 
In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District New York Asbes­
tos Litigation, 897 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1990). 
Many times a contractor will argue that if the government 
simply approves the contractor's design plans, then the govern­
ment has actually approved "reasonably precise specifications". 
The law is clear, however, that merely approving a final design 
without "any substantive review or evaluation of the relevant 
design features" or a government review simply to determine 
that "the design complies with general requirements initially 
established by the government" does not establish the defense. 
Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d at 1480. Simi­
larly, a government review for compliance with general perfor­
mance criteria does not establish that the government required 
reasonably precise specifications. Id. at 1487 n. 14. As noted by 
the Supreme Court in Boyle, where the government specifies 
general requirements such as cooling capacity for an air condi­
tioner, but not the "precise manner of construction", then "[n]o 
one suggests that state law would be generally pre-empted in 
this context." Boyle, I 08 S. Ct. at 2516. The discretionary 
exercise of design control requires at a minimum the type of give 
and take between the government and the manufacturer on the 
specific design element at issue such as was found by the court 
in Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 
1311 (11th Cir. 1989) (F-16 electrical panel which involved 
extensive discussions between manufacturer and government). 
Where the contractor could have complied with its duties 
under state law without conflicting with some significant 
federal policy as manifested in its contractual obligations, 
the government contractor defense simply does not preempt 
state law. 
The second prong of the Boyle test requires that the 
equipment simply conform to the government approved design 
specifications. This, like the third prong, is a fact sensitive 
inquiry. Whether the product actually conformed to the contract 
specifications or whether the contractor knew about some risk 
and warned or failed to warn the United States are questions 
requiring extensive factual development. Ordinarily there is a 
detailed series of testing and approval requirements for products 
manufactured pursuant to government contracts. The so-called 
"first article" testing is an important part of the process and 
extensively documented. Close attention should be given to the 
paperwork surrounding the first article testing, because it may 
well shed light on the government's design interests. 16 
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The third prong of the Boyle test requires that the manu­
facturer either warn the government about the specific dangers 
inhering in the design unless those dangers were known to the 
government already. The function of this portion of the test is to 
provide some assurance that the government has made an 
informed design decision, that it has balanced design consider­
ations with whatever other non-safety related policies might 
take precedence. 
The availability of the government contractor defense as to 
the product design does not relieve the contractor from 
providing adequate warnings. 
Failure to Warn Remains a Viable Theory 
The availability of the government contractor defense as 
to the product design does not relieve the contractor from 
providing adequate warnings. Under the Boyle test, courts have 
uniformly rejected the defense where the contract is silent as to 
what warnings are to be provided. See In Re Hawaii Federal
Asbestos Cases, 715 F. Supp. at 300 aff'd 960 F.2d 806 (9th 
Cir. 1992) ("Plaintiffs rely on a failure to warn theory of 
liability. The government specifications at issue in this case did 
not require nor did they forbid warnings of any kind . Clearly, 
the defendants could have complied with their state law-im­
posed duty to provide adequate warnings without breaching 
their government contract."; Dorse v. Armstrong World In­
dustries, Inc., 513 So. 2d at 1268. In other words, a contractor 
can satisfy its duty to warn under state law and fulfill its 
obligations under the contract. 
In order to establish the government contractor defense on 
a w arning theory, the contractor must show that the "applicable 
federal contract includes warning requirements that signifi­
•-•�cantly conflict with those that might be imposed by state law"
and that "whatever warnings accompanied a product resulted 
from a determination of a government official." In Re Eastern
and Southern District of New York Asbestos Litigation, 897 
F.2d at 630. 17 It is hard to conceive of any federal policy which
would conflict with a manufacturer's providing users of its
products with adequate safety information. See Garner v.
I 
Santoro, 865 F.2d at 635.
Post-Boyle Developments 
763 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (D.D.C. 1991 ); Hobdy v. United
States, 762 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (D. Kan. 1991). 
A good summary of the manner in which Boyle has been 
read in the context of the government contractor defense ap­
pears in In Re Aircraft Crash Litigation, Frederick Mary­
land, 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1335 (S.D. Ohio 1990). This case 
affirms the theory that Boyle requires a significant conflict 
between the military or governmental procurement contract (the 
uniquely federal interest) and state law. This conflict is 
established where the contract itself specifies the particular 
design specification. "Where, however, the government merely 
orders a particular piece of equipment from stock, the requisite 
conflict does not exist, the Supreme Court reasoned, because it 
cannot be said that the federal government has a significant or 
unique interest in the design features of that piece of equipment. 
Similarly, state tort law requiring a particular safety feature is 
not preempted where a government contract specifies a particu­
lar operational characteristic but does not mandate 'the precise 
manner of construction' and therefore does not preclude the 
inclusion of that safety feature." 752 F. Supp. at 1335. 
In In Re Chateaugay Corp., 132 B.R. 818 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991) the postal service was significantly involved in
the development of the very specifications that went into the
request for proposal. Id. at 823-24. Indeed, it appears that postal
services engineers developed the initial specifications. Id. at
823. In addition, the government engaged in further discussions
on the specifications with the manufacturer to refine the final
details. Id. The government also "inspected, tested, and ap­
proved" the pilot model. Id. The Bankruptcy court found that the 
defense was applicable and a bar to plaintiffs claims, but the
district court reversed holding that the defense is limited to the
specific context of military hardware. See 146 B.R. 339
(S.D.N.Y. I 992).
Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 
1991) also affirmed the essential teachings of Boyle. The air 
conditioner in Stout was a 38,000 BTU unit used by the Army 
to cool its Hawk Missile System Mobile Repair Unit. Believe 
it ornot I had a defendant cite this case to the court as an example 
of how the defense was applied to a "stock" product, an air 
conditioner! The Army Corps of Engineers was the original 
developer of the VEA4-3 air conditioner. The government 
wrote the initial specifications including the engineering draw­
ings and the required shop drawings and pre-production models. 
Id. at 333. None of these specifications either required or 
prohibited the installation of a safety device such as a wire 
screen to cover the condenser fan. Id. at 334.The opinions continue to interpret Boyle in two ways. 
First, the courts have reaffirmed that Boyle grounded the
government contractor defense in the doctrine of preemption, The manufacturer, Fairchild Industries, Inc., obtained the 
Senior Unsecured Creditor's Committee v. FDIC, 749 F. contract to redesign the air conditioner. Fairchild developed a 
Supp. 758, 769 (N.D. Tex. 1990). The defense is operative only complete preliminary design layout, submitted it to the Army 
where there is a distinct conflict between state law and some engineers who reviewed it, critiqued it and made changes. The 
overriding federal interest. Second, the courts look for a mani- Army then approved the preliminary design. Id. After the Army
festation of that overriding federal interest through the exercise approved the final detailed drawings no change could be made 
l of governmental discretion as defined through the discretionary by the manufacturer without the units being automatically
function exception developed in the context of the Federal Tort rejected. The Army and Fairchild engaged in extensive testing
Claims Act. See Industria Panificadora, SA v. United States, of the prototypes. The Army spent a month reviewing the results
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of the tests. The plaintiff in the case raised most of the same 
arguments that we did about the government's approval (rubber 
stamping mere acceptance of manufacturer's design choice), 
but these were rejected by the court which determined that under 
the facts set forth above, the government did approve reason­
ably precise specifications. The court distinguished the Boyle 
air conditioner example by characterizing it as a case where "the 
government was indifferent to the challenged design" Id. at 336 
n.l, that is, the government was only interested in a stock off­
the-shelf air conditioning unit.
Conclusion 
A large body oflaw has grown up around the government 
contractor defense. 18 The Boyle case has delineated the contours 
of the defense and established that it requires a conflict between 
an identifiable federal policy and the operation of state tort law 
and the ultimate exercise of the government's design discretion. 
Absent these two critical elements the defense should not apply. 
I 
ENDNOTES 
I. The government contractor defense is most often encountered in
products cases involving military equipment, but creative defense counsel 
can raise it in virtually any circumstance where a government contract is 
involved. This defense has actually been raised as a defense to insurance bad 
faith where the insurer had a reinsurance agreement with a government 
agency. 
2. See In Re Chateaugay Corp., 132 B.R. 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991) rev'd 146 B.R. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
3. Plaintiffs counsel should never-allow the manufacturer to proceed
on a straight motion to dismiss. Counsel should immediately file a motion 
to permit discovery on _the underlying factual basis for the defense. Obviously 
if you have identified the defense as a potential issue then you must plead 
around its strictures. It is frequently a manufacturer's tactic to file an early 
motion for summary judgment, even before filing an answer, attaching for 
example the affidavit of its design engineer and a 100 pages of government 
contract. In such a situation, counsel for plaintiff should immediately seek 
relief through either Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) or SCRA l -056(F) which allow 
discovery prior to having to respond to the motion. Counsel may then proceed 
with discovery on the government contract defense issues. Keep in mind that 
because this defense is tied into the particular design elements at issue, 
discovery on the defense will often also provide discovery on the merits. 
4. This is why the defense is most commonly applied to the manufac­
ture of military hardware where the purpose of the government contractor 
defense is to prevent judicial review of strategic, tactical design decisions 
which consciously sacrificed safety on the altar of combat efficiency. 
5. The history and contours of the defense are well explicated in Tillett
v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 59 I, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Shaw v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 739-741 (I Ith Cir. 1985);
Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 561-62 (5th Cir. I 985). In essence, the 
defense descended from three lines of federal cases. First, the defense was 
based upon the Fe res-Stencil doctrine which makes the government immune
for injuries arising out of or incident to military service. See infra n. 9.
Second, the defense was rounded upon the "uniquely federal" interest in
protecting government officials in the exercise of discretionary duties as
related to civil liabilities arising out of the performance of federal procure­
ment contracts. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 25 I 0,
I 08 S. Ct. 2514 (1988). Third, the contractor has been found to be acting as
the agent of or surrogate for the federal government and therefore partakes of 
the sovereign's immunity. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 
309 U.S. 18 ( 1940).
6. Although the government contractor defense arises under federal·
law, some states have adopted the defense as part of that state's common law. 
See In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District New York Asbestos 
Litigation, 897 F.2d 626, 635 (2nd Cir. 1990); Brown v. Caterpiller 
Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 249 (3rd Cir. 1982). New Mexico has not yet 
adopted this defense. The Tenth Circuit has not offered its own comprehen-
sive analysis of the defense. The Tenth Circuit made a passing reference to 
the Boyle decision, but offered no analysis. See Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel 
Electric Corp., 894 F.2d 371,372 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990). 
New Mexico has, however, adopted contract defenses as to indepen­
dent contractors that present certain similarities to the government contractor 
defense. New Mexico recognizes what might be described as a species of the 
"contract specifications defense." New Mexico has recognized a limitation 
on the liability of independent contractors to injured third-parties. New 
Mexico courts have applied this limitation to a narrow range of cases and 
counsel should not permit a manufacturer to mislead the court into thinking 
that these cases represent New Mexico's adoption of a government contractor 
defense. The general rule for an independent contractor's liability is that it 
"may be liable to third parties who may have been foreseeably endangered by 
the contractor's negligence, even after the owner has accepted the work." 
Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Commission, 98 N.M. 119,645 P.2d 
1375, 1376 (1982). The limitation on that liability is described as follows: 
A. The independent contractor should not be liable if
he merely carefully carried out the plans, specifications or 
directions given him, at least where the plans are not so 
obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follow 
them. 
8. If the owner discovers the danger, or it is obvious to 
him, his responsibility may supersede that of the contractor. 
Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Commission, 645 P.2d at 
1376. The New Mexico cases apply the test in a limited context of indepen­
dent contractors performing construction work. See Tipton v. Clower, 67 
N.M. 388, 356 P.2d 46 ( 1960) (cementing process for drilling operation);
Baker v. Fryar, 77 N.M. 257, 259-60, 421 P.2d 784 ( 1966) (installation of
sprinkler system); Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Commission, 98
N.M. I I 9, 645 P.2d 1375, 1376 (1982) (construction of roadway). No New
Mexico case has extended this limitation on an independent contractor's 
liability to manufacturers or suppliers of defective products. These cases 
should not be extended to create a new defense which really has no direct 
theoretical basis for a state sovereign.
7. Sanner provides an excellent example of the safety/combat effi­
ciency trade-off which characterizes the defense. In Sanner, the military 
made a specific design decision that its jeeps would not have seatbelts 
because troops needed to be able to get in and out of the jeep quickly and 
without encumbrance. The court held the manufacturer was protected from 
suit because the government had made this specific design decision. 
8. Many of the pre-Boyle cases utilized a similar test articulated in
In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. I 046 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) which provided that the defense was available where the 
contractor established that: (I) the government provided the specifications 
for the product; (2) the product manufactured by the contractor met the 
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government's specifications in all respects; (3) the government knew as 
much or more than the contractor about the hazards to people which 
accompanied the use of the product. Id. at I 055. 
Another formulation of the defense which pre-dated Boyle was found 
in Shaw v. Grumman Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985). In Shaw, the 
, Eleventh Circuit grounded the defense in a separation of powers analysis 
which "compel[ed] the judiciary to defer to a military decision to use a 
weapon or weapons system (or a part thereof) designed by an independent 
contractor, despite its risks to servicemen." Id. at 743. The Shaw court's 
formulation of a test that would advance the governmental interest was: "A 
c ontractor may escape liability only if it affirmatively proves: (1) that it did 
not participate, or participated only minimally, in the design of those products 
or parts of products shown to be defective; or (2) that it timely warned the 
military of the risks of the design and notified it of alternative designs 
reasonably known by the contractor, and that the military, although fore­
warned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with the dangerous 
design." Id. at 746. The Supreme Court in Boyle expressly rejected this 
formulation of the test concluding that it did not adequately protect the federal 
interest "embodied in the discretionary function exception." Boyle, I 08 S.Ct. 
at 25 I 8. 
9. The court in Boyle was presented with the opportunity to adopt the 
Feres/Stencil doctrine as the theoretical underpinning of the defense. Feres 
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 ( 1950) and Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) collectively bar personal injury claims
against the United States incident to military service. The majority rejected
the Feres doctrine and focused instead upon the discretionary function
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act as a means to limit the defense. See
Boyle, I 08 S.Ct. at 2517; Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913
F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1990); Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865
F.2d 14 74, 14 79 (5th Cir. 1989). Boyle rejected the Fe res doctrine because
it would permit the manufacturer of a standard commercial or stock product
to escape liability through the simple fortuity of a military rather than civilian
contract. The application of the government contractor defense, the Supreme
Court held, would be wholly inappropriate to a standard commercial product
whether the procurement contract was for the military or a civilian branch of
government. Boyle, I 08 S. Ct. at 2517.
I 0. It is in this context of military procurement for combat products 
that a unique federal interest is most visibly in conflict with state tort law 
because the government often exercises its discretionary judgment by spe­
cifically balancing the "trade-off between greater safety and greater combat 
effectiveness." Boyle, I 08 S. Ct. at 2517. Where, however, no federal interest 
in the particular design specifications can be shown, the contractor cannot 
claim the benefits of the defense, since the federal government has obtained 
no corresponding benefit from the defective design. 
11. Federal preemption is entirely a matter of congressional intent.
See. e.g., Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, I 06 S. Ct. 1890, 
1899 (1986); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 
132, 141 ( 1963 ). Preemption may occur where (I) Congress expresses a 
"clear intent to preempt state law," Louisiana Public Service Commission 
v. FCC, I 06 S. Ct. at 1898 ("express preemption"); or where a congressional
intent to preempt may be inferred because the state law operates as an 
insurmountable barrier to accomplishing the objective of the federal law or 
where Congress through its legislation has "occupied the field." Id. ("implied
preemption").
There is a heavy burden to establish a preemption claim because time and 
again the Supreme Court has stated that "courts should not lightly infer pre­
emption," International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, I 07 S. Ct. 805,811 ( 1987), 
and there is a heavy presumption against finding preemtion where the claim 
of preemption addresses the historic police powers of the state, such as 
common law tort liability. See, e.g .. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 144; Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Company, 736 
F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984). "[W]e start with the proposition that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superceded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 ( 194 7). This presumption
against preemption was recently reaffirmed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., _U.S._, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 
L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). 
The key to federal preemption is the determination whether congress in­
tended to preempt the particular state common law claims at issue. The 
analysis begins by looking to the plain language of the statute. "Absent 
explicit preemptive language", there is no express preemption and the 
analysis must be one of implied preemption. Gade v. National Solid Wastes, 
120 L.Ed.2d 73, 84 ( 1992). 
12. Whether it is in fact a fourth element or simply the context in which 
to analyze the three elements of Boyle is fairly debatable. The point is that the 
preemption analysis adopted by the court appears to require that there be a 
clear and identifiable conflict between the application of state common law 
and some federal policy. In many cases the federal interest in its procurement 
contracts may suffice, see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505-506, but counsel should 
always look behind that general interest and attempt to determine what 
specific and articulated federal policy would suffer if a common law claim 
were permitted to go forward. 
13. The last term of the Supreme Court decided a major federal 
preemption case that may bear directly on the type of "conflicts" analysis 
suggested by the Court in Boyle. The United States Supreme Court conducted 
a major analysis of federal preemption in Cipollone v. Liggett Group 
lnc.,_U.S._, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed. 2d 407 (1992). The Cipollone case 
involved the preemptive effect of the Federal Cigarette Labelling and 
Advertising Act of 1965 and its successor the Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969. The issue was the extent to which the warning 
requirements of the Acts preempted state common law claims for failure to 
warn, breach of warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy. The 
decision has a relatively complex series of rulings and the Justices on the 
Court were somewhat fragmented in their analysis. The major points of the 
majority opinion are as follows: 
A. There is a presumption against preemption and the central 
analysis is whether the federal statute contains an express preemption 
provision. l f so, then the analysis begins and ends with the scope of the 
preemptive provision and you do not need to examine any form of 
implied preemption. Only where there is no express preemptive 
provision in the federal law is it necessary to proceed to examine 
whether there is an implied preemption. In the words of the Court, 
"When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has 
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing 
that issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of 
congressional intent with respect to state authority,' ... 'there is not 
need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws from the 
substantive provisions' of the legislation." Cipollone, 120 L. Ed. 2d 
at 423 citations omitted. 
B. State common law claims are a form of regulation, as 
opposed to a state statute or rule, which can be preempted by a federal 
regulatory scheme. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a recent case has applied the Cipollone 
analysis to the Federal Aviation Act in arriving at a conclusion that the Act 
did not impliedly preempt state law tort actions by occupying the field of 
airplane safety. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, slip op. No. 91-
2065 (10th Cir. February 16, 1993). The Tenth Circuit used Cipollone to 
support its conclusion that a savings clause in the Act, together with the 
absence of an express preemption provision, demonstrated that Congress did 
not intend to preempt state common law. Cleveland, slip op. at IO (constru­
ing Cipollone to conclude that the "doctrine of implied preemption is general 
inapplicable to a federal statute that contains an express preemption provi­
sion" and that " 'enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of 
a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.' " Id. 
quoting Cipollone. 
How does Cipollone speak to the government contractor defense? If the 
touchstone of the defense has become whether there is a conflict between an 
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identifiable federal policy and the application of state tort law, then Cipollone 
suggests that, because of the deference afforded the historic police powers of 
the states, Cipollone, 120 L. Ed. 2d at_, the defense should not apply absent 
a clearly expressed federal intent to limit state tort actions. Such an intent may 
be found in the traditional deference given to military command decisions, 
but would be difficult to find in other contexts. 
14. The Boyle court's emphasis on a conflicting federal policy has led
some courts to question whether the defense even applies outside the context 
of special military requirements. See In Re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 
715 F. Supp. 298, 300 (D. Haw. 1988) aff'd960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.1992); 
Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d at 637-38. Indeed, those cases reported after 
Boyle which have recognized the defense have arisen overwhelmingly in the 
specific context of military equipment with special combat considerations. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989) (VIPER 
missile); Zinck v. ITT Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (night 
vision goggles); Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311 
(I Ith Cir. 1989) (F-16 fighter instrument panel); Maguire v. Hughes 
Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1990) (T63 helicopter engine bearing); 
Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698 ( 4th Cir. 1989) (F/A-
18 carrier support aircraft landing gear). The concentration on military 
combat products and the almost complete absence of non-military items is not 
surprising because the combat efficiency/safety balancing question presents 
the paradigm for the government's exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Harduvel 
v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d at 1322; Kleeman v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d at 70 I.
15. As one astute judicial wag from the Second Circuit has pithily
noted "[s]tripped to its essentials, the military contractor's defense under 
Boyle is to claim 'The Government made me do it.'" In Re Joint Eastern and 
Southern District New York Asbestos Litigation, 897 F.2d at 632. ( 1990). 
16. Counsel should seek out any requests for exceptions to the
contract which may reveal that a particular design decision was actually 
proposed by the contractor. 
17. Indeed, there is authority that the government's failure to warn is 
not a discretionary function within the meaning of that exception to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. See Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 877 
( I 0th Cir. 1976) (holding that government's decision "to omit warnings of 
dangerous or hazardous conditions ... (does] not come within the exception 
for discretionary functions."); Dube v. Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F.2d 790, 
800 ( I st Cir. 1989); In Re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 542 N. Y.S. 
2d 118, 121 (Sup. Ct. 1989). If the government itself is not immune for failure 
to warn, then a fortiori a contractor with derivative immunity cannot par­
take of the defense. 
18. What follows is a list of representative cases involving the 
government contractor or related contractor defenses with a brief description 
of the salient characteristic of the case. 
I. In Re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d 187 (2nd Cir. 1987) Government
contractor traditionally shielded construction projects, but logically
extends to military contractors.
2. In Re Air Crash Disaster of Manneheim Germany, 769 F.2d I I 5
(3rd Cir. 1985) Gov't contractor defense, place of manufacturer
applies despite accident occurred elsewhere, contractor entitled to
gov't contractor defense where military had knowledge of defect and
approved same. Pennsylvania law.
3. Boyle, Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of
David A. Boyle, Deceased v. United Technologies Corporation, 
487 U.S. 500, I 08 S. Ct. 2510 ( 1988) Major U.S. Supreme Court case 
defining contours of the government contractor defense. 
4. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 696 F.2d 246 (3rd Cir.
1982) Government contractor defense to a military contract involving
non-combat equipment.
5. Burgess v. Colorado Serum Company, Inc., 772 F.2d 844 (11th 
Cir. 1985) Defense applies generally to government contractors not 
just military contracts.
6. Bynum v. FMC Corporation, 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985) Good
summary of government contractor defense and other related contrac­
tor defenses such as that available under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 404. Government contractor defense grounded in federal
common law.
7. Casabianca v. Casabianca, 428 N. Y .S.2d 400 (NY 1980) Govern­
ment contractor defense - compliance of supplier to military specifi­
cations in time of war complete defense.
8. Cumming v. Nielson's, Inc. and Warren Louis Snyder, 108
N.M.198,769 P.2d 732 (Ct. App. I 988) Industry standard - not
conclusive on breach of duty.
9. Dorse v. Armstrong World Industries, 716 F.Supp. 589 (S.D. 
Fla. 1989) No government specification preventing additional warn­
ings, could have complied with state law duty to warn, affirmed 898 
F.2d 1487 (I Ith Cir. 1990)
I 0. Dorse v. Armstrong World Industries, 5 I 3 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 
1987), Military contract - asbestos, No defense when contract silent 
on safety or warnings. No defense when product standard commercial 
item. 
11. Dube v. Pittsburgh Corning, 870 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1989), 
Military contract - asbestos, no defense to failure to warn; not within 
discretionary function exception.
12. Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1989), Military 
contract - paint, good case on warnings, discussion of significant
conflict in policy, necessity for fully developed factual record.
13. Harduvel et al., v. General Dynamics Corporation, 878 F.2d
1311 (11th Cir. 1989) Military contract F- I 6, Boyle test intended to
insure discretionary decisions.
14. Hunt v. Robert Blasius, et al., 384 N.E.2d 368 (Ill. 1978)
Contract design defense, follows Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 
404 NOTE: different analysis for strict liability and negligence. 
15. In Re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 715 F.Supp. 298 (D.
Hawaii 1988) aff'd 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992). Asbestos - failure
to warn proceeds where government did not require or forbid warn­
ings.
16. Jackson v. Deft, Inc., 273 Cal.Rptr. 214 (Cal. App. I Dist. 1990)
Government contractor defense can apply to a standard commercial 
product.
17. Johnston et al. v. United States of America, et al., 568 F. Supp.
351 (D. Kansas 1983) Contract specification defense pursuant to
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 404.
18. In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District New York Asbestos
Litigation 897 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir. 1990) Government contract de­
fense highlighting that it is federal government which must be in
significant conflict with state law. Stock commercial products are not
displaced by the defense. Discretion requires government official to 
make decision.
19. Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 890 F.2d 698
(4th Cir. 1989) Military contract, landing gear FIA 18, good case to
show kind of detailed government involvement in complete combat
item.
20. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol Division of the Boeing Co., 755
F.2d 352 (3rd Cir. 1985) Government contractor defense affirmed. 
21. Mackey v. Maremont Corporation, 504 A.2d 908 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986) Government contract defense, military - recognized by
Pennsylvania.
22. Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft, 912 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1990), Post
Boyle, federal defense, emphasis on discretionary function.
23. Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft, 725 F.Supp. 821 (D.N.J. 1989)
District court opinion affirmed by the Third Circuit as noted above. 
24. Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242 (5th Cir.
1990) Military contract, defective mortar shell, defense applies only
to design defect.
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25. McCabe Powers Body Company v. Paul Sharp and Wanda
Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980) Contractor specification defense,
defect must be open and obvious.
26. In Re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 542 N.Y.S.2d 118
(Sup. 1989) Failure to warn is not a discretionary function.
27. Nicholson v. United Technologies, 697 F.Supp. 598 (D. Conn
1988) Military contract, landing gear.
28. Nielson v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Company, 892 F.2d
1450 (9th Cir. 1990) Gov'!. contractor defense, post Boyle-civilian
employee injured by standard paint fumes; no significant conflict, no
defense.
29. Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, et al., 721
F .Supp 1019 (S. D. 111. 1989) Stock product exception not applicable
to component parts. Poor analysis, asbestos exposure, government
made decision re: use of asbestos tape.
30. Price v. Tempo, Inc. and Alb. Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359 (1985)
Government contractor defense, non-military applies to city,
contractor's duty to disclose defects, Pennsylvania law.
31. Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd., 874 F.2d 946 (4th
Cir. 1989) Military contract defense insulates supervisor from lia­
bility under provisions of Maryland Workers' Compensation Act.
32. Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 145 N.E. 321 (N.Y.
1924) Contractor specification defense.
A Simple Rear-End Auto Accident - Cont. from Front Page 
gibles" to the jury; preview of experts' testimony and counter­
ing the opposing expert; post trial review and evaluation. 
THE PLAINTIFF 
In August 1988, the plaintiff slowed/stopped his car 
suddenly to avoid striking a dog in the street. While doing so, he 
was struck in the rear by the following vehicle. 
At the time of the accident, Terry, the plaintiff, was a 36-
year-old male born in the Midwest. He was attractive, 190 
pounds and over 6 feet. He had earned an Associate of Science 
Degree in management; a Bachelor of Science in Real Estate; 
and a General Contractor's GB 98 Certificate. He constructed 
homes. 
Prior to the accident, the plaintiff participated in a de­
manding and highly competitive career as a real estate sales 
broker and also owned his own corporation which built homes. 
He worked in excess of50 hours per week; was athletic; had his 
FAA private pilot license; and had achieved $ I .4 million in 
residential listings in a 14-week period with RECA, Inc. He had 
an active personal life, numerous hobbies and had relocated 
from San Diego to Albuquerque a year or so before this accident. 
He had two motor vehicle accidents before the accident of 
record: one in 1982, the other in 1986. The 1982 accident 
resulted in cervical strain, low back strain, compression fracture 
at T7, and myofacial headaches for which he was treated by an 
orthopedic physician, and neurologist, Dr. John Kitchen. The 
1986 accident resulted in sprain/strain syndromes to the cervical 
and thoracic spine, for which he was treated by a chiropractic 
physician. 
The 1988 accident resulted in immediate head pain, blood 
on the tongue which was observed by the scene witness, who 
33. Sanner et al. v. Ford Motor Company et al., 364 A.2d 43
(Super. Ct. N.J. 1976) Government contractor defense, military, 
government rejected proposal for seatbelts, specific exercise of dis­
cretion to exclude seatbelts from military jeeps.
34. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corporation, 778 F.2d 736 (l l th
Cir. 1985) Government contractor defense.
35. Smith v. Xerox, 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989) Government 
contractor defense, soldier could not recover under doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
36. Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Commission, 98 N.M.
119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982) Contractor design specification defense.
37. Tillett v. J. I. Case Company, 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985) 
Government contractor defense, U.S. military.
38. Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474 (5th Cir.
1989) Military contract, submarine diving valve, good explanation of
exercise of discretion.
39. Zinck v. ITT Corporation, 690 F.Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
Military equipment, very special item, government changed specifi­
cations, independent testing.
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was a nurse, and brief loss of consciousness. Terry was taken to 
an emergency room and evaluated. X-rays revealed wedging of 
the T8 vertebral body. He was treated with an injection in his 
lower back, given a prescription for medication and discharged. 
He immediately returned to his job as a broker at RECA Real 
Estate. 
Because of increasing thoracic pain, he went to several 
physicians, including an anesthesiologist, orthopedist and neu­
rologist. 
MRI of the head revealed unremarkable brain scan with 
the exception of some increased intensity in the maxillary and 
ethmoid sinuses. Mild bulging was found at cervical levels, and 
a compression fracture was found at T7. 
Terry's sales performance at RECA deteriorated. He quit 
and obtained a salaried job as a right-of-way agent for the New 
Mexico State Highway Department. After several months he 
was terminated from that job for insubordination and refusing to 
follow instructions. 
His primary problems were decreased memory, personal­
ity changes, head and orthopedic pain. His medical diagnoses 
included the following: 
I. post-concussive syndrome
2. post-traumatic headaches
3. cervical sprain
4. thoracic sprain with compression fracture at T7
and HNP at T7-T8.
5. lumbosacral sprain
6. post-traumatic maxillary and ethmoid hemor­
rhage
7. neuropsychological deficits in cognitive func­
tioning
8. psychological condition associated with chronic
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